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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the problem of secret
key generation for multiple parties. Multi-user networks usually
require a trusted party to efficiently distribute keys to the legiti-
mate users and this process is a weakness against eavesdroppers.
With the help of the physical layer security techniques, users
can securely decide on a secret key without a trusted party by
exploiting the unique properties of the channel. In this context,
we develop a physical layer group key generation scheme that
is also based on the ideas of the analog function computation
studies. We firstly consider the key generation as a function to
be computed over the wireless channel and propose two novel
methods depending on the users’ transmission capability (i.e.
half-duplex and full duplex transmissions). Secondly, we exploit
the uniqueness of the prime integers in order to enable the
simultaneous transmission of the users for key generation. As a
result, our approach contributes to the scalability of the existing
physical layer key generation algorithms since all users transmit
simultaneously rather than using pairwise communications. We
prove that our half-duplex network model reduces the required
number of communications for group key generation down to a
linear scale. Furthermore, the full-duplex network model reduces
to a constant scale.
Index Terms—Secret key generation, multiple parties, multi-
user networks, phy-layer security, group key generation, analog
function computation, wireless channel, prime integer, simulta-
neous transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE use of wireless technologies, as an indispensable partof our daily lives, also brings out additional vulnerabili-
ties to communication systems as a result of its multiple access
nature. The current applied method for hiding information
from adversaries is the encryption and decryption of the mes-
sages at the upper layers. However, providing legitimate parties
with a secret key without leaking to adversary is a weakness.
Instead of using secrets keys, another perspective against
eavesdropping is proposed in [1] by Wyner that the physical
layer can be exploited to deny the adversary from correctly
obtaining the messages from the channel. In the following
years, Wyner’s work has been carried further by Maurer [2],
Ahlswede and Csisza´r [3] and these seminal studies created a
new point of view to the physical layer and secrecy. Since then,
this perspective has been extended to different wireless channel
models (Gaussian wiretap [4]) as well as various wireless
technologies (artificial noise, beamforming [5], [6]) in order
to improve its efficiency.
From an interesting perspective, physical layer studies in-
tentionally reduce the capacity of the main channel in order
to completely destroy the eavesdropper’s reception [1]. As a
result, the remaining transmission rate (secrecy capacity), is
a crucial point in the network design. In order to overcome
the capacity problem, physical layer key generation methods
has been proposed [7]. These methods overcome the key
distribution problem of the cryptic approaches by securely
distributing keys to the legitimate users. For this purpose,
entities that are special to the channel between two nodes
such as fading and reciprocity has been exploited to generate
secret keys to node pairs. The pairwise solutions also extended
to the multiple node networks. While the broadcast nature
of the wireless channel (as 1-to-M transmission) has been
an assistant for group key generation, multiple access nature
(as M -to-1 or M -to-M transmissions) is overlooked in the
literature.
As the fading and reciprocity of the wireless channel is
made use of for key generation, these concepts has also been
the basis of analog function computation (AFC) studies, pio-
neered by Gastpar [8], [9] and Stan´czak [10]–[12]. However,
the purpose and the method of AFC are completely different
from the key generation algorithms. AFC exploits the multiple
access nature of the wireless channel by targeting M-to-1
networks where a single sink node receives signals from the
other nodes of the network.
Traditionally, communication and computation in these net-
works are separated as the sink node receives (communication)
and processes (computation) each transmission individually.
The aim of the AFC is to combine these two processes
over the wireless multiple access channel (W-MAC) in order
to relieve the sink node from its computational load. The
method is based on matching the mathematical model of the
W-MAC with the desired function by applying the pre and
post processing steps [10]. A frequently used example of an
AFC application is a sensor network gathering temperature
measurements, where sink node is only interested in the
average temperature. In AFC, following a pre-processing step,
sensors simultaneously transmit their information and the
superposition property of the W-MAC ensures that the sink
node receives the average without any computation.
Inspired by AFC techniques, in this paper, we consider the
problem of constructing a secret key for multiple parties by
focusing on the fading and the multiple access nature of the
W-MAC. An illustration of the proposed network model is
given in Fig. 1. With the observations from AFC methods, we
match the W-MAC with a function that outputs secret keys to
U1, ..., UN in the Fig. 1. The signal processing used in AFC
enables us to simply exploit the uniqueness of the fading such
that the simultaneous communication is only meaningful at
the spatial location of the legitimate users. We also use prime
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the network model with users, U1, ..., UN and Eve.
The proposed secret key generation method provides each users with a secret
key, S, while giving a corrupted version, SE , to Eve.
integers in the pre-processing step and thanks to the unique
prime factorization theorem, legitimate users can correctly
construct secret keys, S, in a simultaneous communication
while Eve receives a corrupted version, SE .
A. Related Work
1) Physical layer key generation: Generating key from the
channel for pairwise communication is studied by Maurer [2]
and Csisza´r [3]. In these studies, upper and lower bounds on
the achievable key size are derived [2] and the key-capacity
is defined as the maximum achievable key rate between two
terminals without leaking information to a third terminal [3].
Information theoretic background of these works is extended
to multiple terminals for the first time in [13] by Csisza´r.
In the following years, a large amount of physical layer
studies focus on the key generation problem and all of them
exploit the unique channel characteristics for key generation.
Some of these studies use a discrete channel model and
are interested in the error probabilities of transmission pack-
ets chosen from binary alphabets [14]–[17]. The group key
generation methods usually works with pairwise communica-
tions [18]–[20] resulting in scalability problems. Additionally,
the studies using broadcast communication model (as 1-to-
M transmission) require multiple sequential communications
[21]–[23]. To our knowledge, this is the first paper considering
simultaneous transmission over a wireless multiple access
channel (as M-to-1 or M-to-M transmissions) for group key
generation.
2) Analog Function Computation: Simultaneous transmis-
sion over a wireless multiple access channel is firstly exploited
for the purpose of function computation (computational ef-
ficiency) in multi-node networks [8], [10]. In the following
studies, it is stated that any function is computable over the
wireless channel with proper signal processing [12], [24]. In
[25] and [26], the idea behind the AFC is extended to MIMO
and beamforming technologies. Other than computational ef-
ficiency, AFC is used in sensor networks in order to increase
the consensus rate of gossip algorithms in [27], [28]. To our
knowledge, this is the first study that exploits AFC for key
generation by considering key distribution as a function to
compute over the wireless channel.
B. Contributions
We propose two methods for multiple parties that provide
N users with the same secret key and present the contributions
of our methods as follows.
1) Traditional key exchange techniques require pair-wise
communication rounds in order to provide N users with
a secret key in the absence of multi-linear maps [29].
We exploit the multiple access nature of the W-MAC
with the unique prime factorization theorem in order to
reduce the communication rounds required for group key
generation.
2) In the first method, we consider a network where the
nodes are able to only transmit or receive at a time
(half duplex). With the multiple access nature of the
W-MAC, key generation of N users can be established
in N communication rounds (by M-to-1 simultaneous
transmission). This method reduces the required com-
munication rounds to linear scale.
3) Considering that the communication between the users
are full duplex (as in [30], [31]), the key generation can
be established in one simultaneous communication (M-
to-M) and the communication of the system is reduced
to constant scale without the existence of the multilinear
maps.
4) Proposed methods does not require trusted third party or
any prior common secret between the users as opposed
to traditional methods.
C. Paper Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
background knowledge needed to present our methods are
given with definitions. In Section III and IV, we present our
key generation approaches which are based on half-duplex and
full-duplex transmission, respectively. Secrecy of the proposed
approaches are examined in Section V. The paper is concluded
in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We consider a network, where N users and an eavesdropper
are spatially distributed at least half wavelength (λ/2) away
and operating at the same frequency. Hence, it is assumed
that any two wireless links in the system are uncorrelated
from each other [32]. We denote the set of all users by
U = {U1, . . . , UN}, where users are in an arbitrary order.
We specify any transmitting user as Ui ∈ U and any receiving
user as Uj ∈ U , where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, i 6= j. A set of
prime integers are defined as P ⊆ N. Essentially, users are
tasked to transmit and receive information in order to generate
a secret key denoted by S. Meanwhile, it is assumed that an
3eavesdropper, E, is able to listen to the wireless channel and
receive information.
As mentioned before, the proposed secret key generation
methods are based on the superposition property and the fading
of the W-MAC. Linear model of the W-MAC is defined as
follows.
Definition 1 (W-MAC [11]). Let xi be the signal transmitted
by the user Ui and let yj be the observation of W-MAC at the
receiver end of the Uj . The channel fading coefficient and the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) between the Ui and
Uj are denoted by hij and ωj , respectively. Then, we define
the signal received by Uj over the W-MAC as
yj =
N∑
i=1
hijxi + ωj . (1)
As seen in (1), W-MAC matches with the summation
operation when hij = 1 and ωj = 0. Since the users are
capable of estimating their channel fading coefficients with
pilot sequences [33], we can assume the effect of channel
is reversible. Consequently, the conditions that matching the
channel with summation is satisfiable and will be referred as
ideal W-MAC. The authors in [12] prove that with proper
adjustments to signals at transmitter and receiver ends, any
desired function is computable over the W-MAC. The adjust-
ments named as pre-processing and post-processing functions
of transmitter and receiver ends respectively are defined as
follows.
Definition 2 (pre-processing function [12]). A process ϕi
defined as x ∈ R, ϕi(xi) = (ϕ ◦ xi) is the pre-processing
function of the transmitter node Ui.
Definition 3 (post-processing function [12]). A process ψj
defined as x ∈ R, ψj(yj) = (ψj ◦ yj) is the post-processing
function of the receiver node Uj .
Basically, pre-processing and post-processing functions are
means to adjust the channel model to represent desired
functions. An example of these functions can be given for
multiplication operation in order to narrow the focus on the
proposed methods. Multiplication of information over the W-
MAC is the main idea that our algorithms built on. The pre-
processing function of multiplication can be written as
ϕi(xi) =
1
hij
ln(xi). (2)
Remark 1. In AFC applications, channel is assumed to be
ideal W-MAC since it is inverted beforehand. As a result,
pre-processing functions do not contain channel estimation
process and the channel fading coefficient, hij , is not shown.
Here, we explicitly include the fading component into the pre-
processing functions since it will be a key factor in full-duplex
transmission of the users.
Natural property of logarithm enables us to obtain the
logarithm based product of signals. Accordingly, conversion
to polynomial base is required at the receiver end. Post-
processing function
ψj(yj) = exp[yj ] (3)
completes the reconstruction of multiplication of signals at the
the receiver end. For the output of the post-processing function
given in (3), the background steps are given below
ψ
(
N∑
i=1
ϕi(xi)
)
= ψ
(
ln
(
N∏
i=1
xi
))
=
N∏
i=1
xi. (4)
In sensor networks, a desired function is required in the FC,
therefore W-MAC is modeled as compatible with one receiver
in AFC applications. For secret generation purpose, we require
every user to be an FC. As a solution, two different methods
are proposed with different modeling of the W-MAC in the
next sections.
III. HALF DUPLEX TRANSMISSION BASED SECRET
GENERATION
The first method for secret generation is based on the idea
that a user can obtain a function of information from other
users to generate a secret key in one simultaneous communi-
cation. Repeating the communication for N users results in a
network where all users have the same secret key. As in the
AFC sensor network applications, all users work half-duplex
where a user either transmits or receives. Accordingly, we
model the W-MAC for half-duplex transmission based secret
generation as follows.
Definition 4 (W-HMAC). Let N ∈ N be a finite number,
j : {0 < j ≤ N} be a number and i : {{1, ..., N}, i 6= j} be
a set of numbers. Let ϕi(xi) be the pre-processing function
applied by the user Ui and let ψj(yj) be the post-processing
function applied by Uj . Then, we define
ψj(yj) = ψj
 N∑
i=1
i 6=j
hijϕi(xi)
 , (5)
the post-processed output of W-MAC as W-HMAC.
An illustration of the W-HMAC is given in Fig. 2. As shown
in the figure, a user Uj ∈ U acquires a function of information
transmitted from the other users Ui ∈ U \ Uj . From this
observation, we propose a scheme to generate secret key to
Uj in two steps as follows.
Initialization. All users, U , in the network choose a prime
integer pi ∈ P and define their input to the W-HMAC as
xi = pi. The pre-processing and post-processing functions of
the W-HMAC is defined as follows
ϕi(pi) =
lnxi
hij
ψj(yj) = exp[yj ].
(6)
Secret Generation. Users communicate over the W-HMAC
where an arbitrarily chosen Uj ∈ U acquires the multiplication
of the inputs given as
ψ(yj) =
N∏
i=1
i 6=j
pi. (7)
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Fig. 2. Illustration of W-HMAC where x1, ..., xn are inputs and ψ(y) is
output. W-HMAC is half duplex adaptation of W-MAC with proper pre-
processing and post-processing functions to generate secret key to one user.
It should be noted that W-HMAC is half-duplex and Uj
only receives information. As a result the output of the W-
HMAC does not include pj . Since Uj already knows pj , by
multiplying pj with ψ(pi), Uj can reach to a secret
S = pjψ(yj) (8)
which includes information from all U . Thereafter, Uj can
generate any key using S depending on the application. The
result gained from one communication is extended to the
following theorem that provides N users with the same S.
Theorem 1. A network of N users can reach to the same
secret key S in N rounds of simultaneous transmission over
the W-HMAC.
Proof. Output of the W-HMAC given in (7) can be expressed
as
ψ(yj) =
S
pj
. (9)
Since Uj knows pj and ψ(yj); S is solvable for Uj . When
the secret generation step is repeated N times in order where
each user of U is chosen as Uj once, solving S results with
the same output for each Uj since S is equal to the set of
chosen prime integers regardless of Uj .
In the next section, we present an algorithm that provides N
users with the same secret key in one round of communication.
IV. FULL DUPLEX TRANSMISSION BASED SECRET
GENERATION
In the second method a novel perspective for the W-MAC is
considered. We propose the generation of the same secret key
to N users with full-duplex communication of N users where
each user simultaneously transmits and receives. Therefore, the
channel model for full-duplex transmission is given as follows.
Definition 5 (W-FMAC). Let N ∈ N be a finite number and
i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}. Let ϕi(xi) be the pre-processing function ap-
plied by the user Ui, SIC be the self interference cancellation
xN
..
.
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ψN
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SIC
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. ...
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Fig. 3. Illustration of W-FMAC where x1, ..., xn are inputs and
ψ1(y1), ..., ψN (yN ) are outputs. W-FMAC is full-duplex adaptation of W-
MAC with proper pre-processing and post-processing functions and self
interference cancellation [34] generate secret key to N users.
function and ψj(yj) be the post processing function applied
by Uj . Then, we define
ψj(yj) = ψj
 N∑
i=1
i 6=j
hijϕi(xi)
 , (10)
the self interference canceled and post-processed output of W-
MAC as W-FMAC.
W-FMAC outputs a function of inputs of Ui to Uj as
depicted in Fig. 3. Unlike the W-HMAC where only one Uj
receives a function of information, W-FMAC outputs different
functions of information to each Uj . This stems from the fact
that the channel fading coefficient from Ui to Uj is different;
hence, regardless of any pre-process, multiple Uj are going to
receive different functions of information.
Remark 2. AFC methods are able to compute desired func-
tions on the grounds that fading of the W-MAC is inverted.
Since this is not possible for multiple receivers and fading
effects the inputs; outputs of the W-FMAC are not only
different but also meaningless functions.
Although any Uj obtains a different function, we propose
a method to salvage enough information to generate the same
secret key to all U in one simultaneous communication over
the W-FMAC. The proposed method is explained in two steps
as follows.
Initialization. All users in U choose a prime integer pi ∈ P
and define their input to the W-FMAC as xi = pi. The pre-
processing and post-processing functions of the W-FMAC is
defined as follows
ϕi(xi) =
ln (xi)
h∗
ψj(yj) = exp[yj ]
(11)
where h∗ is defined such that
hij
h∗
= cij ,∀i, j and cij ∈ Z+.
Aim of the novel pre-processing function is to alter the W-
MAC such that the effect of the fading to inputs becomes
a positive integer. Thereby, output functions contain mean-
ingful information despite they are still different for multiple
5receivers. In other words, since x1, ..., xN are prime integers
and the effect of the fading is positive integer, by the nature
of the prime numbers, ψ1(y1), . . . , ψN (yN ) contain each input
with different exponents.
Secret Generation. All users in U communicate over the W-
FMAC with given initial inputs and pre-processing and post-
processing functions. The output of W-FMAC for any Uj ,
ψj(yj) =ψj
(
N∑
i=1
hij
ln(pi)
h∗
)
= ψj
(
N∑
i=1
cij ln(pi)
)
=
N∏
i=1
p
cij
i ,
(12)
has retractable information on the inputs. By factorizing the
output, Uj obtains the product of inputs. However, input of the
Uj is removed by SIC (as in [34]), and pj does not appear
in the output. Since Uj already knows pj , by multiplying pj
with the product of inputs, Uj obtains the secret key
S = pj
N∏
i=1
i 6=j
pi (13)
which includes input of all users of U . After that, any desired
key can be generated by using S. Obtained result on (13) leads
to the following theorem.
Theorem 2. A network of N users can reach to the same
secret key S in one communication over the W-FMAC.
Proof. S given in (13) is solvable by Uj since Uj knows
pj and (
∏N
i=1 pi) is extractable from ψ(yj) by factorization.
Solving S results in the same output for each user in U since
S is equal to the set of chosen prime integers regardless of
Uj .
V. SECRECY OF THE PROPOSED APPROACHES
The main idea behind the secrecy of information sharing
comes from the destructive effect of the W-MAC on trans-
mitted signals. For this purpose, information is carried on
the amplitudes of the signals. With pre-processing and post-
processing functions, as defined in W-HMAC and W-FMAC,
the information required to generate a secret key is passed
along to other users only to be meaningful at the receiver of
the targeted users.
As this alone would be a quite simple characteristic to hide
information from eavesdroppers, broadcast nature of W-MAC
exploited with simultaneous transmission of multiple users
makes the recovery of meaningful information impossible. In
addition, simultaneous transmission establishes the efficiency
of our methods on the time slots required as W-HMAC needs
N and W-FMAC needs one time slot to provide N users with
the same secret key. As the fading and the broadcast nature
of the W-MAC are the two complementary security layers
of our methods, we examine the amount of information that
E obtains under these layers in the following context of this
section.
A. Secrecy of the Secret Generation over W-HMAC
As mentioned before, communication over the W-HMAC
provides Uj with the input information of the other users in
the network. With pj and ψ(y); Uj can generate S and use it
with any algorithm for encryption and decryption processes.
As long as the algorithm is secure, the only way for E to
obtain the secret key is to obtain signals correctly towards Uj
by being physically present close to Uj . However, obtaining
the output of W-HMAC is not enough to construct S, since E
still needs the input of the Uj .
Only solution for E to obtain all the information to construct
S is the eavesdropping of at least 2 rounds of communications
where minimum 2 users in U receive output sequentially from
W-HMAC. In this case, E receives the following expression
from one sniffing,
yE =
N∑
i=1
i 6=j
hij
ln(pi)
hiE
=
N∑
i=1
i 6=j
hij
hiE
ln(pi) =
N∑
i=1
i 6=j
rij ln(pi)
where
rij =
hij
hiE
.
After the post-process, E obtains
ψE
 N∑
i=1
i 6=j
rij ln(pi)
 = N∏
i=1
i 6=j
p
rij
i
as output of the W-HMAC. Note that the quantity E obtained
contains exponentially distorted versions of inputs which
brings us to the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let ψj(yj) be the output Uj receives from the
W-HMAC and rij = hij/hiE . As long as |1 − rij | 6= 0, the
output E obtains from the W-HMAC, ψE(yE), is different from
the output Uj obtains.
Proof. Difference between the W-HMAC outputs of Uj and
E is the following expression,
|ψj(yj)−ψE(yE)| = | exp[yj ]− exp[yE ]|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣exp
 N∑
i=1
i 6=j
ln pi
− exp
 N∑
i=1
i 6=j
rij ln pi

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∏
i=1
i 6=j
pi −
N∏
i=1
i 6=j
prij
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(14)
which can be organized as
=
N∏
i=1
i6=j
pi
1− N∏
i=1
i 6=j
p
rij−1
i

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Er
.
Note that E will have a discrepancy once the error, Er, is not
0 and it occurs when |1− rij | is not equal to 0.
Depending on the channel fading coefficient, choosing high
digit prime integers makes decipher of S infeasible since high
6discrepancy occurs between the W-HMAC output of E and
Uj . Following lemma and example given below illustrate the
destructive effect of the fading and simultaneous transmission
on Eve’s computation.
Lemma 1. Let s = 1.a1a2a3 . . . am be a real number where
m represents the length of the decimal part such that the first
non-zero term in the decimal part is ar for some positive
integer r. Then n · s has the same first r digits with n and the
remainders will be different.
Proof. Proof is given in Appendix A.
Example 1. Suppose each user has selected a prime in-
teger with at least 6 digits and E obtains ψE(yE). Let
|rij | > 1.0001 then from Lemma 1, last two digits of the
prime numbers which was selected by Ui will change and
the multiplication ψE(yE) will be completely different (except
maybe first two digits) than ψj(yj).
An observation from Example 1 is the effect of number of
users. Since each input of Ui will be distorted by |rij |, a linear
increment in the number of users will exponentially increase
the discrepancy that E faces.
B. Secrecy of the Secret Generation over W-FMAC
Secret generation over W-FMAC outputs N different func-
tions of the inputs to N users. Common information of
these N functions is that N inputs exist in a function with
different exponents. The input of the Uj is removed by SIC
before post-process. Since E receives the raw signal (with
the unwanted input), sniffed output that E obtains will be
distorted even when E is physically close to a user. It is
also infeasible for E to obtain ψj(yj). The underlying reason
will be explained in the following discussion. E receives the
following expression from W-FMAC,
yE =
N∑
i=1
hiE
ln (pi)
h∗
=
N∑
i=1
hiE
h∗
ln (pi) =
N∑
i=1
i6=j
rij ln(pi),
(15)
where
rij =
hiE
h∗
.
When we look at the difference of the W-FMAC outputs given
below; rij has a mirror term, cij in the Uj’s output which is
an integer,
|ψj(yj)−ψE(yE)| = | exp[yj ]− exp[yE ]|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣exp
 N∑
i=1&i6=j
cij ln pi
− exp
 N∑
i=1&i 6=j
rij ln pi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∏
i=1
i6=j
p
cij
i −
N∏
i=1
i 6=j
p
rij
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(16)
If we substitute rij with vijcij where vij = rij/cij , above
expression becomes
=
N∏
i=1
i6=j
p
cij
i
1− N∏
i=1
i 6=j
p
cij(vij−1)
i

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Er
which is under the statement that Theorem 3 provides. Our
conclusion from the Theorem 3 is that the secret keys gener-
ated over the W-FMAC is secure against eavesdroppers.
VI. CONCLUSION
We model the W-MAC with proper pre-processing and post-
processing functions in order to match the W-MAC with a
function that outputs a secret key which includes information
from other users. Two different models, W-HMAC and W-
FMAC are presented for half-duplex and full-duplex commu-
nications, respectively. Secret key is generated to N users over
the W-HMAC in N concurrent transmission. In the second
method, N users generate a secret key over the W-FMAC in
one simultaneous transmission. We also examine the secrecy of
our methods. It is shown that generated secret keys are secure
against a passive eavesdropper. As a complementary future
work, we consider to investigate and to combat the effect of
noise in the proposed methods.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THE LEMMA 1
Let n = n1n2 . . . nd where d is the number of digits of n.
The decimal representation:
n = n1 · 10d−1 + n2 · 10d−2 + · · ·+ nd−1 · 10 + nd
and
s = 1+a1· 1
10
+a2· 1
102
+· · ·+ar 1
10r
+ar+1
1
10r+1
+· · ·+am 1
10M
as ar is the first non-zero term in the decimal part
a1 = a2 = · · · = ar−1 = 0
and
s = 1 + ar
1
10r
+ ar+1
1
10r+1
+ · · ·+ am 1
10M
Then
n× s = (n1 × 10d−1 + n2 × 10d−2 + · · ·+ nd) ·(
1 + a1
1
10r
+ a2
1
10r+1
+ . . . am
1
10m
)
= n1 × 10d−1 + n2 × 10d−2 + · · ·+ nd
+ar
(
n1 × 10d−r−1 + · · ·+ nd × 10−r
)
+ar+1
(
n1 × 10d−r−2 + · · ·+ nd × 10−(r+1)
)
+ · · ·+ am
(
n1 × 10d−m−1 + · · ·+ nd × 10−m
)
= n1 × 10d−1 + n2 × 10d−2 + · · ·+ (nd−r−1 + n1)×
10d−r−1 + (nd−r−2 + n2 + n1)× 10d−r−2.
Hence multiplication results in the number with the same first
r (or r − 1) digits as the number n.
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